Why coercion doesn’t work

WHILE leaders of the hybrid government prioritise foreign engagements and overseas trips, domestic challenges continue to intensify. Public discontent and unrest are mounting across the country but the ruling elite remains detached from this reality.

In much of Balochistan the writ of the state doesn’t exist. Militant violence and terrorism are spiralling out of control. In KP escalation in TTP-sponsored terrorist attacks have left people fearful and distrustful of law enforcement authorities. Last week, lawmakers from both sides of the aisle in the KP Assembly described actions against terrorists as “aimless” and ineffective. Unrest in Azad Jammu and Kashmir is far from over. Elections are approaching but they already lack public credibility. At the national level, the government-opposition stand-off continues to fuel a fraught political environment and deepen polarisation in the country. The PTI-led opposition has called for protests on Aug 5 to mark three years since its leader Imran Khan has been in jail.

Meanwhile a nationwide lawyers’ movement is taking shape to protest against the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments. The Lawyers Action Committee argues that these amendments have made the judiciary subordinate to the executive and gravely undermined judicial independence. It also demanded probes into alleged “excesses” committed in Balochistan, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan and release of all political prisoners. Add to this ferment public frustration with the growing cost-of -living burden and power outages during peak summer and the picture is one of growing turmoil with public anger rising against the rulers by the day.

What is the hybrid government’s answer to this? There isn’t one. There certainly isn’t a problem-solving response. Instead, the strategy is denial. Pretend everything is fine. Then attack anyone who says otherwise. To the extent that there is a response, it relies primarily on political repression and coercive measures to manage opposition, unrest and public discontent. But putting a lid on problems doesn’t make them go away.

Authoritarian rule can neither meet Pakistan’s challenges nor make the government secure.

The record is there for everyone to see. Along with undermining judicial independence by controversial constitutional amendments there is a marked descent into authoritarianism. Democracy exists mostly in name. Parliament is little more than a rubber stamp. Freedom of assembly is curbed. The opposition is suppressed with its leaders locked away in jails and given long sentences in dubious cases. The media is controlled with TV channels told what not to broadcast and even who to invite to talk shows. Dissent is silenced. Digital space is restricted. Pressure has been mounted on human rights organisations that impedes their work.

Yet the lesson to be learned from Pakistan’s tortured history is that governments cannot strengthen or secure themselves by such oppressive and strong-arm methods. What counts is legitimacy and public acceptance that actions taken by the government are fair and lawful. But the notion the hybrid ruling elite has of ideal governance is that provided by a ‘hard state’. The aspiration for a hard state has been frequently voiced by the country’s top military and civilian leaders. What does it mean? Leaders who used that expression have never really explained. They seem to want a state that has strong governance, centralised power and the capacity to assure national security. But what they have established is an authoritarian state.

The hybrid government has at its disposal an array of coercive instruments that it has used to reinforce its power. But has that helped it achieve the core goals of security, stability and the state’s financial solvency? Not by a long shot. It mistakes a hard state for a competent one. A competent state is an efficiently functioning, trusted state that can secure these goals with public support and of course by a legitimate political leadership. A competent state is one able to effectively perform the core functions of a strong state — collect taxes to run the state, ensure rule of law, maintain order, control the borders and deliver public goods. It is also one in which the instruments of governance are robust and institutions fit for purpose. Trust is an indispensable attribute.

The authoritarian state that has emerged is unable to perform fundamental state functions and is predicated on coercion not trust. Moreover, the aim of its sponsors seems to be the accretion of power rather than the pursuit of public goals. There is another aspect to their flawed assumptions. This relates to the inability to distinguish between power and authority. Power and authority are not the same. Power, however ‘hard’, does not automatically confer authority.

Authority is where power, legitimacy and public purpose intersect. Authority rests on the legitimate exercise of power in the public interest that goes beyond the narrow interests or self-preservation of the ruling elite. The ‘rightful’ use of power, deployed to promote a public agenda, bestows authority. Authority is thus more a relationship with the governed than a capacity. It is based on consent, willingly given, as well as trust, not coercion. Authority also rests critically on credibility.

The question is whether coercion has delivered what the state’s managers want. Has the opposition been eliminated by banning rallies, jailing activists, and blocking its path? Clearly not. It may be in disarray, unable to mobilise and its protests blunted, but its support base and popularity remain intact. Has muzzling the media silenced dissent? Traditional media may be controlled, but social media has become the outlet for free expression and criticism.

Has reliance on kinetic force brought peace to troubled Balochistan? It hasn’t. This is not to say militant violence should go unanswered. But the hard-power approach has failed because it ignores the underlying drivers of the unrest: historical grievances, popular discontent and alienation, poor governance, treatment of Baloch nationalists, and a sense of injustice over both unrepresentative rule and the unfair allocation of resources. No surprise, then, that the province remains in turmoil. In AJK, bans and crackdowns have only hardened protesters and worsened the situation. There are widespread concerns this would undermine Pakistan’s long-standing position on occupied Kashmir.

Authoritarian rule is incapable of resolving Pakistan’s problems or making the government secure. It only lays bare its weakness, its fear, and its rejection of democracy. A strong state is built by empowering citizens, not repressing them.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.

Published in Dawn, July 27th, 2026