The Trump administration has tentatively agreed to allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium without requiring international safeguards intended to prevent nuclear weapons development, according to sources familiar with the matter and documents reviewed by CNN.
The draft agreement, which outlines U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program, is still awaiting President Donald Trump’s signature, even though negotiations between the United States and Saudi Arabia were completed in October 2025.
Two sources said the ongoing conflict with Iran has contributed to the delay. According to Trump, the war was launched partly to stop Iran from using enriched uranium to build nuclear weapons. One source also said the administration may be delaying the signing because the agreement could face bipartisan opposition in Congress, which has the power to block it.
Experts told CNN the deal could give Saudi Arabia a possible path to developing nuclear weapons unless strict safeguards are included. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously said that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would do the same.
Four sources said the agreement includes a civil nuclear cooperation deal, known as a 123 agreement, along with a nuclear safeguards agreement. However, neither document has been sent to Congress for review, even though federal law requires the White House to do so after the agreements are signed.
The White House did not respond to questions about the agreements and instead referred CNN to a statement issued by Energy Secretary Chris Wright in October 2025 announcing the completion of negotiations.
At the time, Wright said the United States and Saudi Arabia had reached an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. He added that both countries wanted to strengthen their partnership, bring American nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and remain committed to preventing nuclear weapons proliferation.
The Saudi Embassy in Washington did not respond to CNN’s request for comment.
According to a source familiar with the matter, the Trump administration briefed some members of Congress earlier this year on the main points of the agreement. The source said it includes a special arrangement that would allow Saudi Arabia to conduct limited uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing within the country, which would be unprecedented in a U.S. nuclear agreement.
Two sources told CNN the uranium enrichment provision includes conditions set by the United States, but the exact limits have not been made public.
The 123 agreement also does not make the final decision on whether Saudi Arabia will receive sensitive nuclear technology or materials. Instead, it establishes the legal framework that allows U.S. companies or the government to transfer nuclear technology and materials for Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program. Any future transfers would still require additional approval.
Uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing are the two main methods used to produce the material needed for nuclear weapons. Most countries with civilian nuclear programs do not enrich uranium domestically. Instead, they purchase it from suppliers such as the United States or Russia and receive it under strict international supervision.
According to documents reviewed by CNN, the draft agreement also does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, an enhanced safeguards agreement designed to improve international monitoring. Instead, the safeguards agreement would be only between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The IAEA is the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, responsible for ensuring countries comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It monitors nuclear programs through inspections, technology and other verification methods.
In a waiver submitted to Congress in 2025, the administration said the proposed U.S.-Saudi safeguards agreement includes additional protections for sensitive nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, fuel production and reprocessing. Although the report did not provide specific details, it said the IAEA would still have a role in monitoring Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program, even without the Additional Protocol.
A source familiar with the matter said the possibility of uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and the absence of enhanced IAEA oversight has raised concerns among many members of Congress. The proposed agreement differs from the 2009 U.S.-UAE nuclear deal, under which the United Arab Emirates accepted enhanced IAEA monitoring and agreed not to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium. Nuclear experts consider that agreement the “gold standard” for civilian nuclear cooperation.
Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association said the Additional Protocol was created because standard safeguards alone were not enough to prevent countries from moving toward nuclear weapons development.
Andrea Stricker, deputy director of nonproliferation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told CNN this is not the right time to weaken international nuclear standards. She said that without the Additional Protocol, the IAEA would have fewer powers to inspect undeclared sites. She added that after efforts to limit Iran’s uranium enrichment, this is the right time to strengthen, not weaken, existing safeguards.
Dan Joyner, a nuclear law professor at the University of Alabama, said he does not believe the absence of the Additional Protocol alone is enough to cause concern. He said the bilateral agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia could reasonably strengthen Saudi Arabia’s current IAEA safeguards, although its effectiveness will depend on the final terms, which have not yet been published.
Stricker also argued that allowing Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium on its own territory carries risks, even if such facilities were initially controlled by the United States. She said Saudi Arabia could eventually take control of the facilities, forcing a future U.S. president to decide how to respond if the country moved toward developing nuclear weapons.
She also warned that Saudi scientists trained to operate uranium enrichment technology could later use that knowledge in secret facilities. Stricker pointed to Pakistan’s nuclear program, which was developed after scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan allegedly used centrifuge designs obtained while working for a European company. Khan is also believed to have shared nuclear technology with Iran, Libya and North Korea, although Pakistan has maintained that he acted independently.
Joyner said he believes the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia outweigh the remaining risks of nuclear proliferation. He said the agreement could create valuable business opportunities for the U.S. nuclear industry, supporting the Trump administration’s energy goals. He also noted that if the United States refuses Saudi Arabia’s requests, Russia or China could offer similar cooperation with fewer safeguards.
Davenport, however, warned that allowing countries to negotiate customized nuclear safeguards could encourage Russia and China to create similar agreements with other nations. She questioned how the United States would react if Russia began promoting its own bilateral safeguards instead of requiring the stronger international standards established by the IAEA.
