DURING US President Donald Trump’s visit to China, the concept of the ‘Thucydides Trap’ invoked by Chinese President Xi Jinping drew the attention of Western strategic circles.
Many observers saw the remark as a subtle indication that China is now more willing to acknowledge its emergence as a global power. For nearly a decade, Beijing carefully avoided projecting itself as a challenger to the international order, cultivating, instead, the image of a leader of the Global South and a partner of developing economies. If that posture is shifting, the implications could be profound for global politics and for countries like Pakistan, positioned at the intersection of great-power competition, economic dependency and regional strategic realignment.
The Thucydides Trap broadly refers to a historical pattern where an established power is threatened by the rise of a new one, creating conditions that could lead to conflict. Xi’s use of the phrase in the context of US-China ties was therefore significant. It was a carefully calibrated political message aimed at Washington.
Many observers interpreted it as a subtle indication by Beijing that it increasingly views the US as a declining power struggling to preserve an international order that long served American interests.
At the same time, China’s leadership appears more confident in presenting itself as both an economic giant and a central actor in shaping the future global order.
This confidence is rooted in economic realities. Over the last two decades, China has transformed itself into the principal manufacturing and trading hub across Eurasia and much of the Global South, while the US continues to dominate the financial and military architecture of the Atlantic alliance system. China’s trade volume exceeded $6 trillion in 2025, and its expanding influence in green technology, infrastructure development and industrial production is now challenging the foundations of the post-1945 US-led order.
Yet the US retains structural advantages through dollar dominance, technological innovation, semiconductor leadership, military alliances, global universities and capital markets. For this reason, most projections for the coming decade point not towards the complete decline of one power or the absolute victory of another, but a fragmented, increasingly bipolar international system shaped by sustained US-China rivalry in technology, finance, AI and geopolitical influence.
China wants all the advantages of great-power competition without a major military confrontation with the US. It prefers to confine the rivalry to the economic and technological domains.
However, a global power is also expected to assume broader strategic and security responsibilities, and the US appears interested in drawing China into a region long dominated by American influence.
Several Western allies remain careful about deeper involvement in the conflict with Iran, but Beijing’s economic ties with and political influence over Tehran, though cautiously exercised, have made China an unavoidable factor.
In the midst of power competition, Pakistan must ably balance its ties with the US and China.
Nevertheless, Trump publicly claimed that he and Xi agreed that Iran “cannot be allowed” to develop nuclear weapons. The White House further asserted that China had assured Washington it would not supply weapons to Tehran. For some analysts, these remarks hinted at a quiet but important layer of Chinese-Iranian strategic cooperation that Beijing prefers to manage discreetly.
Pakistan’s case is particularly important because Islamabad has become a central channel in facilitating communication between Iran and the US, with China supporting the broader diplomatic effort. For Pakistan, this mediation is critical not only for regional stability but also for balancing its relations with Washington and Beijing. During a conversation between the Chinese and Pakistani foreign ministers before Trump’s visit, Chinese media reported that Beijing had urged Pakistan to step up mediation efforts.
Although the Foreign Office rejected the impression that it was acting under Chinese direction, the episode reinforced the perception that China preferred Pakistan to take a more visible reconciliation role in the Middle East while Beijing itself avoided direct involvement in the US-Iran dispute. This reflects China’s traditional diplomatic approach of limiting overt confrontation with the US while quietly protecting its strategic interests.
Taiwan remains a red line for China, and Washington understands the vulnerabilities of its emerging competitor. Some comparisons have been drawn between Iran and Taiwan as strategic balancing points for the US, though such parallels are limited. Nevertheless, Taiwan is increasingly emerging as a major future fault line.
Lack of trust in diplomacy, especially in mediation efforts, creates both security and political dilemmas, not only for Pakistan but also for Iran, the US and China. Iran appears interested in buying more time, believing prolonged tensions could increase pressure on Washington, while Trump has warned that the US would not permit this indefinitely. China, meanwhile, prefers not to become directly involved in mediation. This makes Pakistan’s role as a trusted intermediary even more important. At present, neither the US nor Iran appears to have another immediate channel to replace Pakistan.
For Islamabad, this is an opportunity to build trust with both sides and strengthen its credentials across West Asia as a reliable diplomatic actor, despite scepticism among some circles in Washington and Tehran. Yet every mediator faces a basic limitation: they can facilitate dialogue but rarely possess enforcement power.
If Pakistan succeeds, its middle-power credentials could strengthen significantly, enabling it to negotiate its economic and strategic interests more effectively both regionally and globally. As part of an emerging middle-power network in the Middle East alongside Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Qatar and Egypt, Pakistan could preserve its critical channels with Washington regardless of changes in the White House.
At the same time, Islamabad would maintain balance in its relations with China, an increasingly important challenge for any country that is a neighbour of a rising global power with which it shares deep economic and strategic ties. This balancing act becomes even more important for Pakistan, given its enduring rivalry with India, which many in Islamabad believe has limited appetite for long-term peace.
In this increasingly complex picture, Pakistan appears to be shaping its geopolitical paradigm around a realist approach focused on balance, strategic flexibility and diplomatic utility.
However, while this paradigm may prove effective in the short term, institutionalising the core values of credible mediation may better serve the country, as institutionalism helps shape and strengthen trust among nations.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, May 17th, 2026
