IT was late spring, yet Islamabad was gripped by a heated debate over whether Pakistan should send its troops to Saudi Arabia to participate in the Saudi-Yemen war. The joint session of parliament deliberated for five days, reflecting an unusual level of engagement, as it is rare in Pakistan’s history for parliament to decide matters concerning security and foreign policy.
A similar moment had emerged in May 2009, when the military leadership sought parliamentary support to launch Operation Rah-i-Raast in Swat against what was at that time described and debated as action against its ‘own people’.
After a few days, parliament concluded on April 10, 2015, that Pakistan should remain neutral in the Yemen conflict to play a proactive diplomatic role in ending the crisis. Indeed, it was a crucial decision that parliament made, one which the establishment could not have afforded to take unilaterally; parliament had provided it full support.
Has such a moment arisen again? Pakistan’s leadership is once again hesitant to play a role in the Middle East, ie, to announce its participation in the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), which will be tasked with securing reconstruction zones and supporting a post-conflict governance arrangement in Gaza.
Prime Minister Mian Shehbaz Sharif and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, along with a delegation, went to Washington where they attended a Donald Trump-led Board of Peace meeting, during which the American president and Mr Sharif exchanged “traditional greetings”, with a reminder that Trump had prevented a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. However, Pakistan was not among the five nations that announced their formal participation in the ISF.
Pakistan’s leadership is once again hesitant to play a role in the Middle East.
With Mr Sharif and Mr Dar continuing their meetings in Washington, including with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the leadership may reach a decision in the next few days about Pakistan’s contribution to the ISF, as hinted by the Foreign Office spokesperson during a media briefing.
It is spring again, and the establishment has quickened its pace towards becoming a hard state. And yet, this is a peculiar move for it and it might be considering taking parliament into confidence to seek its endorsement and present it as a consensus decision. Such doubts arise because Pakistan is maintaining a similar position on the ISF, ie, that it would be part of a peacekeeping mandate but would not participate in any disarmament of Hamas or demilitarisation mandates.
Let us recall the April 2015 session, when parliament went a step further: while endorsing the establishment’s plan, it also advised that Pakistan should not send its troops to Saudi Arabia even for training and advisory purposes. In its resolution, it stressed that the leadership should play a proactive diplomatic role rather than deploy troops. Will Pakistan repeat this stance?
The situation is altogether different now. Pakistan has renewed its defence pact with Saudi Arabia, there are new geostrategic alignments in West and Central Asia as well as in Africa, and Pakistan is enjoying the support and favour of President Trump. This time, multiple Muslim nations are participating in the ISF, and it would be difficult for the leadership to make a decision.
However, there is a perception that, more than a backlash from the masses over unpopular decisions, the establishment is apprehensive of the historical factor — history can make us either heroes or villains. Such an impression has a cost not only for individuals but also for institutions. Such assumptions may haunt the decision-makers, but perhaps the strategic advantages they see in any geostrategic adventure they contemplate is not viewed from a longer-term perspective.
Seemingly, Pakistan faces a dilemma: an India-centric security doctrine, seeking help from the West and Gulf countries, while providing a strategic backyard to the US and offering specialised security services to Gulf countries. Though the dream is to eventually become a net security provider to the Gulf and North Africa, defence production capabilities and a weak economic profile are major hindrances to this, but the decision-making skills of the establishment have always been tested on both fronts.
US regional priorities are changing and may require Pakistan’s backyard as part of its strategy against China and Iran, something Pakistan obviously cannot consider, unlike the role it played against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s. Afghanistan is a different story now. It still carries some strategic value for the US for the same purpose, but the country has lost much of its strategic capital and will take a long time to regain even limited strength. Meanwhile, Pakistan will continue to exert pressure on it, and this appears to be sufficient for the US for now.
In the Middle East, where Pakistan has somewhat greater geostrategic space, it often becomes confused about which direction to take. It tries to balance its relations with neighbouring countries, mainly Iran, manage the domestic front marked by sectarian and political divisions, and, more importantly, confront India’s growing influence in the Gulf countries over the last two decades.
In geopolitics, nothing is risk-free, and alliances and equations evolve on the basis of mutual interests and give-and-take, not on moral or ideological grounds. Impartiality and a non-aligned attitude are diplomatic positions that have value in realpolitik, but medium-sized nations must make decisions to remain geo-strategically relevant and to maximise their economic interests.
Pakistan had faced consequences of such confusion in the past as well, for instance, in its relations with Saudi Arabia and the first Iraq war. If the decision seems difficult, parliament is here to happily provide its support, as it did in the past. Joining the Board of Peace without considering its costs would have been a blunder, but once one has set sail, one must cope with the voyage.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, February 22nd, 2026
