PAKISTAN has emerged as one of the beneficiaries of the evolving regional order reshaped by US President Donald Trump’s policies, particularly in the West and South Asian context. However, it remains to be seen how far the country can maintain its relevance, and whether it will make deliberate strategic moves or continue drifting with the Trumpian wave.
After the initial shocks, the world appears ready to respond to the new challenges created by President Trump. A key question revolves around the post-Trump scenario and how the US will behave. Will it continue the Trump approach regardless of who wins, or will it review or reverse Trump-era policies?
European nations may seek to renegotiate their economic, political, and strategic terms with the US. Canada, India, and Japan are likely to proceed with greater caution, while China may focus on protecting and consolidating the gains it has been accruing under Trump’s policies.
In this evolving situation, where will Pakistan stand? Will the country return to the pre-Trump status, when its diplomacy was under strain, and it struggled to safeguard its geostrategic and geo-economic interests?
It is a dual balancing act that reflects Pakistan’s persistent dilemma.
The recently announced EU-India free trade framework and the generally expanding European economic cooperation with India signals a broader recalibration of Europe’s engagement with Asia. China, too, appears to be a relatively reliable economic partner, even though there are certain political economy caveats that are no secret. In terms of trade, Pakistan cannot be compared with its big neighbours China and India. Even with its position as a medium-scale state, trade is constrained by a limited ability to meet international expectations as they evolve.
There is an effort on Islamabad’s part to align itself with China’s strategic and economic priorities, while also trying to remain relevant where Washington is concerned — particularly in a regional environment where India has a clear diplomatic and economic edge. It is a dual balancing act that reflects Pakistan’s persistent dilemma: managing its strategic dependence on Beijing while trying to avoid diplomatic marginalisation in the US.
But it is also true that Islamabad has gained significant diplomatic capital following President Trump’s public acknowledgment of its role in the war on terrorism, as seen in his address to Congress and then later by engaging with the Pakistani leadership — a momentum, reinforced by Pakistan’s participation in the Board of Peace, that was directed at expanding defence collaboration with West Asian and African states.
The estimated value of these defence-related engagements runs into several billion dollars over multiple years. However, the long-term sustainability of these engagements will be contingent on stability in the region and political alignment.
A new strategic equation has since taken shape, which sees Pakistan as a key defence ally along with Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, with partner states extended to include Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Sudan. Even a fractured Libya has featured in this outreach that continues to expand, as underscored by recent high-level military engagements. Together, these developments suggest that Pakistan’s external posture is changing — going from reactive diplomacy towards selective strategic alignment. But whether or not this transition can translate into durable geopolitical leverage remains open to debate.
A complication that is arising in all this is that this situation appears to have President Trump’s approval, which creates the impression that Pakistan is a key US ally in West Asia, particularly where the Gaza peace plan and escalating tensions with Iran are concerned.
Although Israel is neither a formal nor informal partner in the Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistan defence framework, their strategic interests do not necessarily collide. In fact, this aspect is the most delicate one of the arrangement. Pakistan has consciously not signalled any such alignment, constrained as it is by domestic considerations and its position on Iran. With regard to the latter, Pakistan does not support military aggression but also cannot serve as the kind of functional partner the Iranian regime would require during a crisis.
Internally, Pakistan’s establishment has largely closed the potential fault lines from which resistance to its West Asia policy might have emerged, managing religiously inspired actors with considerable skill. However, internal resistance persists in other forms, which may pose challenges for Pakistan, though its consequences are likely to remain primarily domestic and political, rather than become international.
India, by contrast, despite facing difficulties with the US over tariff disputes, unresolved negotiations, and embarrassment caused by Trump’s repeated claims regarding mediation and ceasefire in last year’s stand-off with Pakistan, has managed a strategic rebound. New Delhi has adopted an alternative engagement strategy, which is aimed at countries unsettled by Trump’s tariff, geopolitical and hegemonic policies. Crucially, India’s expanded outreach has come without major compromises: its engagement with the EU has not weakened its ties with Russia, nor has it closed the door to economic cooperation with China.
Pakistan, as a medium-scale state burdened by a weak economy, deteriorating internal security indicators, and chronic political instability, has limited strategic choices. By aligning itself closely with a Trump-endorsed defence equation, it has risked the balance in its relationship with China. This presents what may become Pakistan’s most critical challenge after Trump exits. The post-Trump phase will test Pakistan’s diplomacy and political leadership, particularly its ability to restore trust with Beijing to the level seen around 2018, unless it adopts a more calibrated balancing approach in managing ties with the US.
For now, Pakistan may continue to benefit from short-term diplomatic visibility. However, without cultivating alternative strategic options, its policy space will become narrower, eventually leaving Islamabad with little choice but to align more closely with US- and Saudi-led geopolitical frameworks in West Asia, particularly on sensitive issues such as future engagement with Israel and its position on Iran.
This shift could occur even earlier, depending on President Trump’s moves against Iran and the trajectory his Board of Peace initiative takes. To navigate such scenarios, Pakistan may need a multifaceted plan that could include a new neighbourhood policy aimed at reducing regional tensions and safeguarding long-term geo-economic interests.
The writer is a security analyst
Published in Dawn, February 1st, 2026
