PAKISTAN’S renewed focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is beginning to yield tangible results, particularly in defence cooperation. What stands out in this outreach is its diversity: Pakistan is engaging simultaneously with countries experiencing active conflict as well as with relatively stable Gulf monarchies. More importantly, this evolving engagement raises an important question about how these varied relationships are shaping Pakistan’s strategic outlook, policy choices, and approach to statecraft.
Pakistan’s relationship with the Gulf has long rested on deep-rooted economic, political, and security ties shaped by history. However, the recent expansion of engagement reflects a more deliberate and pragmatic approach, suggesting that Islamabad is recalibrating its regional strategy. This recalibration is not only about defence exports or military diplomacy; it also offers Pakistan opportunities to observe and learn from different models of statecraft, both in contexts of stability and in situations marked by political fragmentation and conflict.
In this broader context, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s first official visit to Pakistan on Friday was particularly significant. It came after Pakistan signed a defence cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia in mid-September, an agreement that attracted considerable attention from observers who were closely watching how Pakistan would balance relations with other Gulf states, especially the UAE and Qatar, given their divergent positions on several MENA conflicts.
Sudan provides a clear example of these divergences. The UAE has been widely reported to be supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while Saudi Arabia has aligned itself with the Sudanese Armed Forces (several reports indicate that Pakistan, through its defence cooperation, has engaged in ways that benefit the SAF, effectively placing Islamabad alongside Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkiye, countries that have leaned towards supporting the Sudanese army against the RSF). This suggests that, despite its careful diplomatic language, Pakistan’s security partnerships are increasingly intersecting with specific regional power alignments.
Pakistan’s role suits the architects of the new Middle East.
Libya presents a different but equally revealing case. Here, Pakistan’s position appears closer to that of the UAE. Islamabad has engaged openly with the eastern Libyan power structure led by Field Marshal Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, while Saudi Arabia’s engagement with Haftar remains limited and largely pragmatic. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s visit to eastern Libya, where he met Haftar, the commander-in-chief of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, was followed by reports that Pakistan had reached a defence deal worth over $4 billion to supply military equipment to the Libyan National Army, despite the existence of a UN arms embargo.
The symbolism of this engagement was not lost on observers: the meeting of two field marshals, an exceptionally rare rank in contemporary global militaries, carried both political and military significance. Apart from Libya, FM Asim Munir visited Cairo, where Pakistan and Egypt reaffirmed their commitment to closer military cooperation, further underscoring Pakistan’s expanding defence diplomacy across North Africa.
Beyond conflict theatres, Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to hold divergent positions on several regional and strategic issues, including the Abraham Accords. Except for a few limited exceptions, Pakistan’s stance has generally aligned more closely with Saudi Arabia, particularly on the Israel-Palestine question. This alignment appears to be translating into more concrete outcomes for Pakistan, especially in defence exports and broader economic cooperation.
It is not clear how long this cooperation with the MENA region and other African countries will last, as conflicts in many states are still unfolding, and it is unclear which side will ultimately prevail. Although, as per global diplomatic norms, Pakistan is showing constraint and officially supporting peace initiatives, its tilt and deals will determine its character in the eyes of these nations. It is not certain that the UAE president’s visit is to incentivise Pakistan in the context of the Abraham Accords, or to offer Pakistan some realignment in Islamabad’s strategic priorities in MENA. But it has unfolded that Pakistan’s new approach is cultivating results.
It has to be seen how Pakistan will create balance in its approach and relationship with its key economic and strategic allies in the Gulf, but Pakistan’s realpolitik is in full swing, pragmatically pursuing its policies in the Middle East, as the Gulf states, including the Saudis and the UAE, were doing up till now in the case of India and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s role suits the architects of the new Middle East, whether they are sitting in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, or beyond, not only because of religious brotherhood, but also military power, which is more accommodating towards their strategic and political interests. Pakistan has gained geopolitical and geoeconomic strength through its accommodative approach, but consolidating these gains has remained a challenge. Perhaps the answer lies in the country’s state structure, which has similarities with many states in the MENA region that are facing chronic political disorder. A Middle Eastern scholar, Fawaz Gerges, in his book The Great Betrayal, sought to find the roots of this political disorder. What he found was that an overemphasis on strengthening security institutions creates two major problems.
First, it allows external actors to intervene in domestic affairs and shape policies. Second, and more crucially, doctrinal authoritarian regimes suppress natural ethnic, cultural, social, and religious divisions, which democracy allows societies to address through continuous dialogue. These divisions and divergences continue to thrive beneath the weight of suppression and eventually surface in the form of fractured ideologies, toxic narratives, and violent tendencies.
Gerges notes that the struggle in the Middle East is multifaceted, extending far beyond territorial disputes. It is ideological, cultural, and institutional, unfolding among a wide range of actors, including conservatives, Islamists, nationalists, and ordinary citizens.
Perhaps there are lessons to be drawn from the region, but this depends on political priorities. When certain policies appear to yield economic and political gains, states often ignore deeper structural similarities and the long-term risks they entail.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, December 28th, 2025
