AMERICAN President Donald Trump recently completed one year of his second term in the White House. The first year of his second term has brought significant changes to the existing rules-based world order. Trump has so far mediated armed conflicts, including the India-Pakistan crisis last year, initiated a war against Iran in June 2025, established a Board of Peace to focus on Gaza, withdrawn from 66 global organisations, improved relations with China, strained ties with European allies, threatened Greenland, and treated friends and foes alike through a uniform ‘tariff’ yardstick.
In fact, the first year of the Trump 2.0 presidency has weakened existing alliance structures, nurtured mistrust among American allies, and introduced deep uncertainty regarding Washington’s strategic commitments to the prevailing world order.
How are states trying to protect their interests in this volatile Trumpian world? Naturally, they are attempting to adapt to new global realities and are readjusting their priorities based on four broader objectives.
First, states are actively seeking or building alliances with like-minded countries to ensure collective security. From the Middle East to Africa and from Europe to Asia, states are increasingly concerned about a fragmented and multipolar world order amid declining American security commitments. Trump’s ever-increasing demands on allies coupled with an overarching emphasis on the protection of the Western Hemisphere have compelled several Middle Eastern, North African and Mediterranean states to pursue defence pacts for collective security.
States are trying to protect their interests in a volatile Trumpian world.
Over the past 12 months, several defence agreements have been concluded by American allies in the Middle East. For instance, Greece, Cyprus and Israel inked a Joint Action Plan in the Eastern Mediterranean in December 2025. The Gulf Cooperation Council activated its Joint Defence Agreement in September 2025 following the Iran-Israel conflict. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement to collectively protect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The UAE and India signed a letter of intent for a bilateral strategic defence partnership. Similarly, several notable defence arrangements are under discussion, including a prospective Saudi-Egypt-Somalia trilateral defence pact and a Saudi-Pakistan-Turkiye trilateral defence framework.
Second, global uncertainty and a weakened rules-based order have accelerated the process of militarisation. Today, powerful states can take unilateral actions with limited fear of international accountability. This trend has compelled states to increase defence spending and acquire advanced weapons to ensure territorial integrity. Global militarisation is often measured through four parameters, including force modernisation, military expenditure, arms procurement, and alliance building. This trend has increased significantly over the past year. The EU has announced the Readiness 2030 initiative to mobilise €800 billion by 2030 for collective security. Around 15 middle powers have increased their defence spending by more than 10 per cent, notably Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Pakistan and India. Demand for fighter jets, particularly China’s J-20 and J-10, France’s Rafale, and the American F-35s has increased by over 73pc. This substantial rise in defence spending, force modernisation and arms procurement is intensifying the arms race and triggering security dilemmas in volatile regions such as the Middle East and South Asia.
Third, states have begun diversifying their economic partnerships to minimise the impact of US economic coercion. While states have, for the time being, absorbed Trump’s overt use of sanctions and tariffs, most export-driven economies have adopted a long-term strategy of seeking new markets and reliable economic partners. This explains why several major free-trade agreements have been concluded over the past 12 months. For instance, landmark free trade agreements have been signed between India and the EU as well as India and Britain. Although negotiations had been ongoing for several years, Trump’s economic coercion, including threats of tariffs on European allies and the imposition of 50pc tariffs on India pushed both sides towards finalising these agreements.
Fourth, states, including those in the EU, have begun considering China as an alternative and reliable economic partner. As Trump has recalibrated Washington’s relationship with Beijing, US allies have followed suit. India is gradually normalising socioeconomic ties with China. The EU and other Western countries have embarked on an unprecedented rapprochement with China with the aim of diversifying economic and political ties beyond Washington. Consequently, over the past 12 months, several European and Western leaders have visited Beijing, including French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Spanish King Felipe VI. These visits have not only strengthened bilateral cooperation through trade and investment deals but have also served as strategic signals to Washington that, in the presence of an unpredictable American president, states prefer engaging with a predictable President Xi Jinping.
Islamabad has largely followed three out of the four aforementioned global trends in one way or another. It has signed the SMDA with Saudi Arabia and offered similar defence arrangements to other Arab states. Likewise, it has strengthened and deepened ties with Beijing in defence, trade and infrastructure development. In September 2025, Beijing and Islamabad formally launched CPEC 2.0 with the aim of attracting additional Chinese investment. Furthermore, Islamabad has increased defence spending and restructured the command and force structure of its armed forces following the armed conflict with India in 2025.
However, Islamabad has neither been able to diversify its economy nor has it been able to find new markets for its exports. Today, despite global shifts and Trump’s unpredictable nature, Islamabad remains highly dependent on the American market for its exports. Islamabad’s top priority should be to identify and access new export markets, especially at a time when its competitors enjoy greater access to European and American markets due to lower tariffs. Moreover, Islamabad must recognise that security-oriented ties with Washington neither guarantee nor substitute for enhanced foreign direct investment and technology transfer. Similarly, heavy reliance on an unpredictable White House, coupled with the absence of new and lucrative partnerships, will not sustain a bloated defence budget.
The writer is an analyst of South Asian affairs. The views expressed are his own.
Published in Dawn, February 6th, 2026
