A POSITIVE that can be extracted from the ongoing confrontation with Afghanistan is that Pakistan has taken an ideological turn before it could drift further into ‘institutionalised radicalism’. The worst aspect, meanwhile, is the loss of lives on both sides, and the shattered dream of a friendly state on Pakistan’s western border as a strategic shield against India and geo-economic connectivity beyond Afghanistan and Central Asia up to the borders of Europe.
It may be hard for many to grasp the argument that Pakistan has taken a turn away from institutionalised radicalism — especially those who believe that the country is already suffering on account of religious extremism. There’s little doubt that religious radicalism had been a power elite project that was nurtured for multiple purposes — crafting national cohesion, cultivating proxies for geopolitical aims and shaping a strategic outlook in which the West and the Gulf were allies during its formative phase. Faith was also used to give the masses a sense of belonging to the state and to make them obedient to authority, rather than to grant them civil rights.
The power elites had crafted the system for the masses whom they sought to rule, though it held little meaning in their own lives. But they failed to achieve their aims of political and national cohesion through religion. Policies that allowed madressahs and religious groups — ranging from moderate to violent — to proliferate failed both state and society. Meanwhile, the major question of national cohesion still looms over the power elites: the Baloch insurgency, rights movements from Gwadar to Azad Kashmir, and a growing sense of ethnic sub-nationalism have weakened the system.
The 1973 Constitution was the best thing that happened to the country. It could have created the needed cohesion among the federating units and among the masses. However, the Constitution, severely distorted over the years, was unable to fulfil that utopian design. The rulers, instead, preferred to exercise power in a manner resembling the Gulf monarchies, with a worldview rooted in an ambition to become specialised security providers to the Gulf and the wider region.
Pakistan must use all means to eliminate terrorist networks operating from Afghan soil.
The enthusiasm the power elites showed after the 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, looking at it as a strategic victory over a superpower, had two inbuilt dangers. First, the ideological influence of the Taliban — had the state here not changed course — would have grown inside the country, particularly among low-income groups, which comprise some 65 per cent of the population, while the rest would have gravitated towards opposing camps, mainly sub-national political, social and violent movements. This would have deepened the dangerous ideological and political divide, and the Taliban-style governance model would have become an attraction for madressahs that produce thousands of students with a narrow worldview. Second, Pakistan’s geopolitical and diplomatic space would have been eroded, a development disastrous for an already weak economy.
The Taliban’s stubbornness and short-sightedness taught the power elites here a lesson, and they quickly changed course before it was too late. Operation Ghazab lil-Haq, which the state launched after the Taliban’s attacks inside Pakistan, is a clear indication of the growing divide between the two countries. That divide runs deeper than differences in religious interpretation; it reflects the divergence between two states with distinct characters. Their future lies in pragmatic cooperation, not in ideological illusions.
If Pakistan refrains from provoking or using the anti-Taliban resistance front against them, there is a possibility of a broader shift in thinking about the use and exploitation of proxies, as was done in the case of the Taliban. This is a different world: the utility of proxies and tolerance for them at the regional and global levels are rapidly declining, as such actors often become a burden and prolong conflicts. China and the Central Asian states may not support such ventures, and without their consent, any adventurism would be costly and could prolong chaos in the region for decades.
Pakistan will have to focus on eliminating terrorist networks operating from Afghanistan using all means — political and coercive. The direction that has been set is the right one, and it can build pressure on the Taliban regime to review its attitude and policies regarding ties with globally designated terrorist groups operating from its soil.
A major challenge that requires greater attention from state institutions is the eradication of support bases and sources of inspiration for terrorists who align themselves with the Taliban and still operate in the country. This inspiration takes many forms: direct support; and the idealisation of the Taliban governance model and advocacy for implementing a similar system in Pakistan.
Though state institutions have achieved certain successes, many leading radical religious figures of the past, who once produced jihadist literature, nurtured extremist mindsets and developed nexuses with international extremist groups, have recently changed their tone, presenting themselves as moderates and patriots, while distancing themselves from the Taliban and other terrorist groups. This change is welcome, but their political economy still thrives on the business of hate and state patronage. If the state regulates religious institutions, confines them to their scholarly role, and refrains from using them for political purposes, the inflated number of such institutions would gradually be rationalised, and they would begin functioning according to their mandate.
The state has also taken initiatives to break the power of violent radical groups, such as in the case of the TLP; but much still needs to be done. The misuse of blasphemy laws, especially by organised groups, often with the support of officials, has been one of the worst forms of institutionalised radicalism. The system has been so corrupted and distorted that it has crossed the boundaries of humanity. State institutions must distance themselves from such spoilers.
This will be possible only if state institutions build trust in constitutional and democratic norms rather than remaining hostage to religiously inspired groups, which have mastered the art of shifting their position in keeping with elite interests.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, March 1st, 2026
