Due to the closure of the Afghanistan border over the past two months, potato prices in Pakistan have plunged to rock-bottom levels. In an oversupplied market with weak exports, even marketable-quality potatoes are being diverted to livestock feed. This has dealt another blow to farmers already grappling with high production costs driven by expensive fertilisers, pesticides, diesel, and electricity. As a result, despite a bumper crop, farmers are suffering immense financial losses.
By contrast, Pakistan imported 51,674 tonnes of garlic, valued at $52 million (Rs14.5 billion) in 2024, according to International Trade Centre data, as domestic production of 115,390 tonnes meets only about two-thirds of the country’s demand. These imports were even higher during 2020–2022.
Potatoes and garlic are both Rabi crops planted in October and require similar soil, agro-climatic conditions, and irrigation requirements. Yet, paradoxically, Pakistan has for years been exporting large quantities of potatoes while importing costly garlic — mostly from China — which drains billions in foreign exchange.
This trend cannot be explained by the theory of comparative advantage, as Pakistan has clear production potential for both crops. Notably, Pakistan’s garlic yields exceed those of India and Bangladesh, the world’s second- and third-largest producers, respectively. Moreover, farm-gate prices in Pakistan remain well below import-parity levels.
The weak sanitary and phytosanitary standards Pakistan abided by to export agricultural products to Afghanistan have made farmers complacent and incapable of producing quality crops that may be traded elsewhere
All this reflects a directionless agricultural sector: potato acreage has risen steadily over recent years, yet no serious effort has been made to develop new export markets. Resultantly, farmers are now forced to sell at throwaway prices. At the same time, no initiative has been taken to expand garlic cultivation, despite persistent import dependence. This is not an isolated case; each year, the country experiences surpluses in some crops with limited export opportunities, alongside shortages in others that necessitate massive imports.
Notably, another policy failure stems from this lack of vision and planning. Over the years, Afghanistan has effectively become a dumping ground for Pakistan’s surplus agricultural produce. For instance, over 60 per cent of citrus exports, around 50 per cent of banana exports, and roughly 41pc of potato exports are destined solely for Afghanistan — not to mention consignments routed to Central Asian states via Afghan transit. A similar market concentration exists across several other crops as well.
Afghanistan’s low food safety standards, weak sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regime, and limited quality requirements for agricultural produce have made this nearby market easy to access. Consequently, Pakistan’s agricultural sector became complacent and has neglected efforts to improve produce quality and comply with the SPS standards required by most other export markets. The recent border closure has exposed this vulnerability.
Given the long history of turbulent bilateral relations, Pakistan’s agriculture sector can no longer afford to rely on Afghanistan as its primary export market. Instead, it must now pursue a broader two-pronged strategy aimed at import substitution and export market diversification.
As a test case for import substitution, the government should pilot a targeted initiative to shift part of the potato area to garlic cultivation. This would help ease balance-of-payments pressures arising from the large trade deficit while simultaneously improving farmers’ incomes. However, such a transition will not occur organically and requires active government support in the initial years — albeit limited to three critical areas.
First, the government should select a few union councils (UCs) in the Sahiwal division — an area well known for potato cultivation and equally suitable for garlic — and extend interest-free loans to farmers for procuring high-quality seed, ranging from Rs100,000 to 200,000 per acre (varying from year to year), and agricultural inputs; the high upfront cost for seeds remains the largest barrier to adopting garlic cultivation.
Second, robust advisory services must guide farmers throughout the production cycle — from seed selection to harvesting and storage. Farmers need experts with hands-on experience in garlic cultivation. The prime minister has repeatedly stated that around 1,000 government-sponsored agricultural graduates have recently received training in China. Given that China is the world’s largest garlic producer and exporter, with over 20m tonnes of production and yields nearly two and a half times higher than Pakistan’s average, some of these trained graduates (in garlic farming) could be deployed in selected UCs for the first two to three years.
Such advisory support is essential to prevent farmers from making the wrong choices and incurring costly mistakes. In the recent past, hundreds of new farmers — influenced by media hype created by the seed mafia — started cultivating the NARC G-1 garlic variety, which was not commercially proven. The variety bitterly failed to attract both households and industry when it hit the retail market after the two- to three-year seed multiplication phase, during which the mafia sold its seed at exorbitant prices.
Third, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) need to be set up in targeted UCs for garlic value addition. Products such as garlic powder, paste, flakes, and oil require relatively low-capital plants, which can largely meet their energy needs through cost-effective solar-powered systems. This intervention will not only boost the marketability of garlic but also create opportunities for value-added exports.
In conclusion, to realise the full potential of the agriculture sector, the government cannot remain a bystander and leave everything to farmers — especially when most are illiterate or poorly educated. Even if crop support prices and input subsidies are withdrawn, the state cannot abdicate its core responsibilities: setting a clear vision, planning crop acreage in line with national needs, formulating coherent strategies, and fostering a business-enabling environment for farmers and SMEs.
Khalid Wattoo is a development professional and a farmer, and Dr Waqar Ahmad is a former associate professor at the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad.
Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, December 22nd, 2025
