The concept of ‘post-ideology’ often causes profound unease, as it suggests that the era of sweeping political narratives and dogmas is giving way to a more pragmatic, technocratic approach to governance. For many, this transition is a deeply troubling thought that feels like a betrayal of the very soul of politics.
Critics frequently ask how systems can function without a moral compass. For instance, the American scholar Francis Fukuyama noted that humans possess an innate desire for ‘thymos’ or the recognition of their dignity, which is often tied to the grand visions and ideological frameworks that post-ideology seeks to discard.
While it is true that pragmatism and realism are themselves forms of ideological thought, they differ fundamentally from ‘hard’ ideologies such as socialism, fascism, liberalism, nationalism etc. Unlike these boxed frameworks, realism/pragmatism is a fluid, outcome-oriented approach that prioritises the survival and prosperity of society over the preservation of abstract theory.
To paraphrase the American philosopher John Dewey, “An idea is true only insofar as it works.” Pragmatism, therefore, is a concept of tangible results rather than a set of moral commands. The German-American political scientist Hans Morgenthau argued that political realism is governed by objective laws of interest rather than moralistic or ideological preferences.
As political narratives lose their grip, governance across the world is increasingly being shaped by pragmatism, data and outcomes rather than dogma
A shift towards post-ideology governance is accelerating, representing a significant global phenomenon. Narratives once defined by the existential struggles between hard ideologies are increasingly being replaced by models that prioritise state efficiency, economic results and social stability. This transition is recognised by political scientists as a ‘managerial’ turn in global politics, a concept first pioneered by the American political theorist James Burnham.
One can understand why this shift is problematic for some. In the contemporary digital space, for example, social media has provided a convenient mechanism for individuals to construct and broadcast their ‘ideological’ personas. Users present themselves as democrats, socialists, religious nationalists or even neo-fascists. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that these declarations have been monetised. Social media creates a commercial incentive to cling to dogmas or move from one ideological cliché to the next.
But whereas ideological personas perform for engagement online, pragmatists and realists are quietly engaged in the substantive work of constructing actual policy. Even realists not directly involved in governance are finding ways to navigate this new reality and benefit from the tangible outcomes it is producing. This divergence reflects what the British-American political scientist Pippa Norris describes as a growing gap between “expressive politics” and “functional politics.”
However, if most states have embraced this ‘age of post-ideology’, how can one explain the parallel rise of populism? The Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe argues that the post-ideology consensus marginalises public participation. Therefore, unspent political energy is eventually captured by populist movements that offer ‘emotionalised’ politics.
Critics of post-ideology politics lament that it treats every societal challenge as a technical issue that only experts can solve. This approach can leave the public feeling stripped of its agency. Consequently, they begin to move towards populists who promise to reclaim this lost power through a majority-backed ideology.
But this ‘loss of voice’ is often a misperception of how modern complexities work. Proponents of post-ideology politics argue that, in a globalised economy, the ‘will of the people’ cannot override the laws of mathematics or of technical competence.
The Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter argued that the average citizen often lacks the specialised knowledge required to navigate complex macroeconomic policy, making the ‘will of the people’ a manufactured rather than a rational force.
In 2017, the Singaporean global strategist Parag Khanna posited that direct democracy is often ill-equipped to handle the complexities of the 21st century. He suggests that a data-driven approach is actually more responsive to people’s needs, because it focuses on measurable outcomes rather than hollow slogans. Therefore, what populists promise is an ‘ideological mirage’ that cannot survive the reality of global economic constraints.
The transition towards a post-ideology world is best illustrated by a diverse array of global models. China offers perhaps the most comprehensive example of this shift. While the ruling party maintains the “Communist” name, scholars such as the Canadian Daniel A. Bell describe China’s governance as a “political meritocracy.” According to Bell, Chinese leaders are not elevated through popular elections or ideological fervour, but through a rigorous administrative pipeline. This system ensures that the right to rule is earned through the demonstration of decades-long competence.
In other words, the legitimacy of the state is derived from its ‘output’ (the tangible improvement of citizens’ lives) rather than from an ‘input’ (such as ideological purity).
Similarly, Singapore exemplifies a state that replaced ideological dogma with the “MPH” framework (meritocracy, pragmatism and honesty). As noted by the former Singaporean statesman Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s survival and rise depended on a pragmatic focus on what worked rather than any specific political ideology.
Post-ideology is now cutting across the Gulf states as well. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have explicitly called for an end to the ‘era of ideology’ in the Arab world. Leaders such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman argue that sectarianism and empty slogans have historically yielded nothing but stagnation and conflict. According to Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, Saudi Arabia is moving toward a “civilisational state model” that prioritises national economic transformation and social reforms over Islamist and pan-Arabist ideologies of the 20th century.
In Pakistan, this pragmatic shift is evident under the current ‘hybrid regime.’ The Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) stands as a significant recent example. Critics often view the council as a model that circumvents parliamentary oversight. However, to the ‘realists’, the council is an attempt to undo the institutional failures of preceding decades, where red tape deterred vital foreign investment. By creating the SIFC as a ‘one-stop shop’, the state aims to secure multi-billion-dollar investment pledges, prioritising economic survival and job creation over the abstract ideal of a civilian bureaucracy that has historically failed to deliver growth.
Another example is the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). Although introduced by the left-liberal Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in 2008, the programme has functioned as a post-ideological initiative, by using biometric verification to bypass local political patrons. According to the World Bank, BISP is one of the highest-ranking social safety nets in the world for targeting accuracy. BISP’s reliance on data is precisely why it has survived across successive administrations.
Furthermore, the ‘Lahore Model’ of development, largely initiated by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), reflects this shift as well. While critics dismiss its rapid expansion of motorways and metro systems as “brick-and-mortar politics”, the pragmatic rebuttal is found in its daily utility. Data from the Punjab Mass Transit Authority indicates that hundreds of thousands of citizens utilise these services daily, suggesting a preference for leaders that ‘gets things done.’
Ultimately, the post-ideology age is a period of political maturation. It acknowledges that, while grand ideologies are emotionally satisfying, the survival of a modern society depends on a fluid, outcome-oriented realism. This realism prioritises the welfare of the population over the preservation of ideological dogmas or ‘political cults.’
Post-ideology states are trying to shed ideology to strengthen themselves by prioritising national interest, economic pragmatism and internal stability over abstract political doctrines.
Published in Dawn, EOS, January 25th, 2026
