PAKISTAN has officially joined the Trump-led Board of Peace (BoP), aimed at ending the conflict in Gaza. This decision reflects Pakistan’s usual realpolitik approach to the Middle East. However, in Pakistan, realpolitik is often seen as a national weakness.
Since the Kuwait invasion, the US invasion of Iraq, the deployment of forces in Yemen, and most recently, attempts to stop the Israel-Palestine conflict, Pakistan has chosen a pragmatic foreign policy. These decisions are justified by geo-economic needs and the desire to stay relevant in the West and Middle East. The key question is: if Pakistan had a strong economy and stable political and social systems, would it make the same choices?
This question is significant because, in such instances, the establishment often makes decisions that contradict prevailing public sentiments, sentiments shaped by opinion-makers and religious clergy who promote a moral narrative anchored in a narrow worldview. In contrast, the establishment tends to adopt a more grounded, interest-based approach.
Pragmatism exacts a price. Those who advocate a moral-politics narrative continue to delegitimise political and military decision-makers, widening the gap between public opinion and state policy. It is worth examining whether a stronger economy and greater political stability would compel Pakistan’s leadership to weigh public sentiment more heavily, or whether strategic interests would still dominate policy choices.
If Pakistan had a strong economy and stable systems, would it make the same choices?
Most countries that have joined Trump’s BoP so far tend to have weak democratic credentials and are predominantly Muslim states that do not prioritise public opinion in foreign policy; their ruling elites often hold worldviews distinct from those of their populations. In contrast, democracies with some degree of pluralism, such as Indonesia or Turkiye, may consider public sentiment more directly, yet ultimately align their decisions with international norms and their political and strategic interests.
Pakistan’s hybrid political system behaves at times like a quasi-monarchy, with critical foreign policy decisions taken outside a broad parliamentary consensus. This dynamic harms the credibility of ruling elites and enables the clergy to reinforce the narrative that the country’s leadership is a ‘puppet of Western imperialism’, asserting that under a truly Islamic system, the decisions would be different. The establishment does not like such equations and continues struggling to produce a counter-narrative.
It is understandable why building consensus on sensitive issues, such as joining President Donald Trump’s BoP or participating in a stabilisation force in Gaza, is difficult in parliament; only a few brave legislators are willing to counter dominant popular perceptions. Political elites also prefer that the establishment manage consensus-building in such affairs, an expectation the institution is not equipped to meet without paying a domestic legitimacy cost.
No doubt, public opinion is not very supportive of joining the BoP, but the situation in the country this time is different. Those who traditionally exploit such sentiments lack the strength to mobilise the masses or bring them into the streets. The Friday protests called by religious parties, and the occasional large demonstrations organised by the Jamaat-i-Islami, JUI-F, or a Shia party, may provide a degree of catharsis for public sentiment, but they are unlikely to generate sustained momentum. Nor are they capable of creating the kind of impression that would worry Pakistan’s partners in the Gulf or the US.0
Apart from the decision to join the BoP, which is justified from several regional and global perspectives, the hybrid regime has weakened the street power of political and religious parties, setting examples through its handling of the PTI and TLP. Although the two cases are not directly comparable — the PTI’s mass protests were rooted in demands for political rights, while TLP was promoting an extremist agenda — the state security institutions dealt with both through a fully muscular approach. As a result, the TLP is now in complete disarray, while the PTI is struggling to mobilise the masses, mainly in Punjab and the federal capital.
This approach reflects the mentality of a hybrid regime that seeks to shape Pakistan into a more authoritarian state. The message is clear for all domestic actors. However, the durability of this model remains uncertain. Much depends on whether this approach can deliver economic improvements, ease public hardship and enhance economic indicators, a challenge that remains considerable.
The realpolitik behind joining the BoP is evident; Pakistan seeks to remain relevant in regional affairs while enhancing defence and economic cooperation with Gulf and African nations. Another angle is that Pakistan has effectively joined the club of Trump’s allies, while India is in the opposite camp, deepening economic and defence collaboration with the EU and its member states, many of which have been at odds with Trump’s policies recently. In this context, Pakistan had limited options to remain neutral.
Although association with Trump may not be popular in domestic or international public opinion, it has provided the architects and operators of the hybrid regime with an opportunity to gain legitimacy and consolidate their control over the political system, something they have sought for decades.
As for the argument that Pakistan should not have joined the BoP because it is a parallel structure to the UN, this reasoning is flawed. The international body has long struggled to provide an effective dispute-resolution mechanism. Who knows this better than Pakistan, given what happened to its Kashmir resolutions in the Security Council? The UN has a history of siding with the powerful and with those on whom it depends on for funding. Whatever Trump wants, he can achieve through the UN as well; after all, it was the UNSC that first passed Resolution 2803, which effectively endorsed Trump’s peace plan for Gaza.
If viewed closely, President Trump and the architects of Pakistan’s hybrid regime share a similar worldview; the only difference is that Trump has an entire world to play with.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, January 25th, 2026
