THE National Security Strategy (NSS) recently released by the Trump administration leaves little doubt that it is an effort to redirect US foreign policy and break in several ways from the past. How much of this will translate into actual policy actions that can be implemented in the real world of changing geopolitics and rapid developments waits to be seen.
The intent is to make protection of ‘core national interests’ the sole focus of strategy in pursuit of President Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy and reflecting his domestic priorities. Economic nationalism is central to the NSS which accords overriding importance to US economic and mercantilist interests. Strengthening America’s economic power and maintaining its economic pre-eminence is a priority goal and trade policy the means to ensure that. The strategy reflects Trump’s transactional and unilateralist view of how America should engage with the world.
A distinguishing aspect of the NSS is implicit acknowledgement that the world is now multipolar, where US leverage has limits. It says America will not seek to dominate the world. This can be read not just as a choice but recognition of a world where there has been a redistribution of global power, especially economic power. When the strategy refers to the US working to “maintain global and regional balances of power” it implies acceptance of that reality and of the influence of the world’s “great and middle powers”.
No longer aspiring to global dominance doesn’t mean the US will not act to prevent others seeking such ascendancy. According to the NSS “The US cannot allow any nation to become so dominant that it could threaten our interests”, so it will ally with others to prevent the emergence of “dominant adversaries”. But it won’t waste “blood and treasure” to curtail the influence of all the world’s powers.
The kind of global leadership envisioned is apparent from the document. Positing a narrower view of national interests suggests selective global engagement and therefore a departure from past US leadership. The document states plainly “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over”. It sharply criticises previous national security strategies that followed the end of the Cold War for being open-ended and overreaching by trying to “shoulder forever global burdens”. Past “American foreign policy elites,” it says, “convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interests of our country.” Instead, it argues “the affairs of other countries should concern the US only if their activities directly threaten American interests”. This is the ‘course correction’ the new NSS aims to carry out.
Trump’s redirection of foreign policy is driven by economic nationalism.
As others have also noted, the strategy envisions a ‘spheres of influence’ world where different big powers hold sway and call the shots in their regions of priority. “The outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations,” the document says. In another departure from the past, the NSS omits any mention of big power competition and the US engaging in this. It takes a non-confrontational approach to China and Russia. Nowhere does it describe them as adversaries. It talks of re-establishing “strategic stability” with Russia. The EU, on the other hand, is viewed as a threat for US interests.
The biggest threat is seen to come from migration, which the strategy seeks to prevent as a top homeland security priority. This goal is projected on to foreign policy. The Western hemisphere is deemed as the most important region where a revived Monroe doctrine will be enforced. US aims in the region are to stop migration, cross-border drugs smuggling and counter China’s growing presence and influence.
China is described as a ‘near-peer’ power and seen as a competitor, not a threat. But that doesn’t mean the US policy of containment is weakening. The Indo-Pacific is regarded as a region of high priority precisely because of that and as the battleground where the US must “win the economic future” and “compete successfully”. China’s industrial efficiency and economic progress are referred to with admiration in the document. The goal is to rebalance America’s relationship with China while forging a “mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing”. The commitment to deter a conflict over Taiwan is reiterated. The announcement of $11 billion in arms sales to Taiwan is in pursuit of that objective and marks an escalatory US move.
India figures in US balance-of-power considerations in the context of the Indo-Pacific strategy, which accords it elevated importance. Improvement is sought in commercial and other ties with India. But it is to encourage New Delhi to contribute to regional security that a greater role for India is envisaged. Despite current difficulties in the relationship, the US continues to see India as a strategic counterweight to China. That provides a firm foundation for longer-term Indo-US relations.
The Middle East no longer counts among core strategic priorities. Among reasons given for this are diversification of US energy supplies, waning of superpower competition by the advantageous position held by America and Iran’s weakening after Israeli and US military attacks. Nevertheless, the strategy commits the US to prevent domination of the region and control of energy chokepoints by an adversary.
Europe is not only downgraded but comes in for harsh criticism. It is depicted as being in economic decline and facing “civilisational erasure” due to immigration and EU institutions. European governments are also assailed for subverting democracy. Because they have failed to curb mass migration, the document pledges to help right-wing populists in Europe come to power, who can secure borders. This despite the NSS claim of non-intervention in other countries. The contradiction between this pledge and actual practice is also laid bare by ongoing US actions against Venezuela, including declaring its government as a ‘foreign terrorist organisation’.
Pakistan is not mentioned in the document. But the new strategy has implications for Islamabad that need to be carefully assessed. At the end of the day, it is actual US foreign policy conduct that will count. How much of the strategy is put into practice is what will matter especially with a leader whose mercurial personality and whimsical ways put US consistency and reliability in serious doubt.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
Published in Dawn, December 22nd, 2025
