THE summit meeting between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping produced no surprises. The pomp and ceremony during the visit were as expected. The summit was more about optics than outcomes, but at its core, it was about managing superpower competition and stabilising the world’s most consequential relationship.
The meeting took place after weeks of delay with an agenda that matched the range of disputes between the two global powers: trade, technology, rare earths and critical minerals, Taiwan and the Iran conflict. The race for AI dominance between the two powers remains intense.
This was the first trip to Beijing by an American president in nearly a decade. The last was Trump’s own visit in 2017. This time he arrived with diminished leverage. His inability to secure any of his stated objectives in the Iran war damaged his standing and eroded US credibility. Trump’s push to reach even a limited framework agreement with Tehran ahead of his China visit did nothing to change that reality. With his approval ratings at a historic low, Trump’s unpopularity at home also weakened his hand.
Most significantly, his tariff offensive against China all but backfired. When Trump raised trade levies on China last year, escalating at one point to 145 per cent, Beijing used its leverage on critical rare earth minerals, over which it has a near-monopoly, to push back by curbing its exports.
This threatened US industry and forced Washington to retreat. It underlined China’s ability to hit back at the US and gave it the upper hand in the trade war. A trade agreement was then reached when the two leaders met in October 2025 in South Korea. But its one-year sunset clause meant it remained a temporary truce.
Trump’s National Security Strategy announced in December 2025, described China as a “near peer” power and cast it as a competitor, not an adversary. But this did not mean dilution of the US policy of containing China.
The document designated Indo-Pacific as a region of high priority precisely for that reason and as the battleground where the US must “win the economic future” and “compete successfully”. The goal set out by the NSS was to rebalance America’s relationship with China while forging a “mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing”.
While the summit’s optics outweighed the outcomes it aimed at managing relations along a stable track.
In practice, Trump has dealt erratically with China, at the same time alienating allies, taking military actions against at least eight countries and switching attention randomly from one region to another. Beijing on the other hand, has acted with a clear and consistent plan bolstered by efforts to increase its global influence and expand its trading relationships. It is now the largest trading partner of around 70 countries with its exports hitting a record level. This has enabled China to project itself as a stable and reliable partner in contrast to Trump’s whimsical and coercive conduct.
All these factors gave President Xi a stronger hand in dealing with Trump in the Beijing encounter. Indeed, most Western analysts agreed the Chinese leader held more cards than Trump. An op-ed writer in the Financial Times described China’s “great wall of confidence” that Trump was up against.
In The Guardian, Simon Tisdall wrote Xi held all the cards, adding that Washington’s “loss of influence and leverage is Beijing’s gain”. A confidential US intelligence assessment ahead of Trump’s trip said China had gained the geopolitical edge over the US due to the Iran war.
China, however, did nothing during the visit to signal this advantage. Instead, it went out of the way to show Trump respect. The high-stakes talks began with the two presidents exchanging warm and positive words. Xi said the two countries “should be partners, not rivals” and to “avoid the so-called Thucydides Trap” — a reference to the theory that underlines the danger of conflict between a rising and a dominant power.
Trump spoke of their “fantastic relationship” and said he had “much respect” for Xi and China. Xi also told Trump that “Taiwanis the most important issue in US-China relations” and warned that unless prudently managed this could lead to conflict between them. At the same time, he told America’s top CEOs accompanying Trump that China will “open wider” for US business. For his part, Trump invited the Chinese president to the White House in September.
On substance, the readouts of the meetings by the two sides showed their differing priorities and concerns with little narrowing of the gap in their positions on key issues. Beijing’s top concern was Taiwan, with China’s claim of sovereignty over the island a red line it wanted to reiterate to the US, as also restate its opposition to American arms sales to Taiwan. For the US side, trade and business deals were the priority but there were few tangible outcomes on that count. There were certainly no big announcements, although it is possible that understandings may have been reached to be publicly unveiled later.
China agreed to buy 200 Boeing jets, more agricultural products and oil from the US, which were claimed as ‘wins’ by Trump. Beijing, however, has yet to confirm this. Extension of the one-year trade truce seems to have been left for later. A Board of Trade is expected to be established to manage trade and investment issues.
On geopolitical issues, Taiwan and Iran, there was no alignment in their positions. Trump did, however, say after the visit that he was undecided on the planned $14 billion arms sale to Taipei. This prompted an anxious response from Taiwan reminding the US of its “security commitment”. Trump also said he would consider lifting sanctions on Chinese companies buying Iranian oil. Ending those sanctions will be a significant concession to Beijing.
A key takeaway from the visit was the agreement to pursue a relationship of “constructive strategic stability”, President Xi’s framework for managing US-China ties with “cooperation as the mainstay” and “competition kept within limits”. Whether this marks the advent of a period of “managed stability” between the two superpowers should become clearer in the months and years ahead.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
Published in Dawn, May 18th, 2026
