PAKISTAN has long viewed the sudden collapse of the Iranian regime as a national security threat. That assessment, which has been held quietly for years, acquired fresh urgency with the outbreak of the Gulf conflict. Pakistan is already confronting heightened militancy and terrorism in its western regions, where groups such as the TTP and BLA operate from sanctuaries in Afghanistan. In our worst-case calculations, a sudden power vacuum in Tehran would risk unleashing a flood of advanced Iranian weapons — particularly kamikaze drones — into these networks.
Field Marshal Asim Munir met President Donald Trump last year in June, during the height of the 12-day war with Iran, and again in September. Iran featured explicitly in their discussions, with Trump publicly noting that Pakistan “knows Iran very well, better than most”. These meetings gave Islamabad insight into the Trump administration’s thinking on Iran while also conveying Pakistan’s concerns to him.
The US-Israel campaign that began on Feb 28, 2026, opened with heavy decapitation strikes and deeper attacks on Iranian military and nuclear sites. Israel saw the moment as a historic opportunity to eliminate what it regards as an existential threat. Reports indicated that certain Arab capitals, while publicly calling for de-escalation, also privately encouraged a more decisive outcome. In Washington, hawkish quarters initially leaned towards regime change, though President Trump has since shifted towards declaring major objectives achieved and exploring a negotiated exit.
What Pakistan fears most is a rapid fracture of central authority in Tehran. The IRGC has already demonstrated its ability to function in a decentralised manner. Even after the early loss of the Supreme Leader and dozens of senior commanders, IRGC units continued launching missiles and drones on local initiatives. In the most plausible scenario, dozens of battle-hardened IRGC battlegroups, each with its own internal command chain, would survive the collapse of central authority. Some would seize control of the vast underground ‘missile cities’ and weapon caches. Others would take physical possession of dispersed Shahed-136/238 drone production lines.
The region could quickly turn into an arms bazaar.
With no foreign power willing to put boots on the ground, reconfiguration of power would be decided by whoever controls the guns and the factories. A younger generation of IRGC commanders, needing funds to expand their influence, would have strong incentives to turn to the black market.
Advanced munitions, including kamikaze drones, could potentially find their way into the hands of arms dealers, non-state actors and militant groups across the region. Iran shares long borders with several countries, creating multiple pathways for proliferation. The region could quickly turn into an arms bazaar, with deadly weapons finding their way to groups that currently operate with far more rudimentary capabilities.
In consequence, the low-tech drone incidents of today could tomorrow become deadly campaigns using Iranian-origin Shaheds and Mohajer systems. Pakistan has already witnessed in the recent skirmishes with Afghanistan when low-tech drones arrived over Islamabad. The leap from those rudimentary systems to sophisticated, long-range Iranian drones would represent a qualitative escalation — and the danger would not stop at Pakistan’s borders. The combination of rogue militias and deadly weapons such as Shahed drones combined with vast ungoverned spaces would create a powder keg stretching from the Kurdish mountains and Iraq to Yemen and across the Red Sea into the Horn of Africa.
Which is why Pakistan has quietly counselled restraint on both sides throughout this crisis. It has urged Iran to avoid targeting Gulf civilian and economic infrastructure and would have conveyed to Washington the severe risks of a regime collapse. These efforts reflect Islamabad’s understanding that uncontrolled collapse in Tehran would create a security vacuum far more dangerous than the current stalemate.
The silver lining is that beyond the rhetoric, initial drafts have been exchanged, with the US presenting 15 points and Iran responding with five. The positions are far apart, as is normal at the start of serious talks. Yet the process has begun.
For Pakistan, the priority remains clear: to bring these two positions closer. Maintaining open channels of communication with all parties Islamabad remains in daily contact with the Iranian leadership, frequent engagement with GCC capitals, and close coordination with Washington as well as Beijing. As Pakistan mediates the initiative the real question in the days ahead is whether the parties can narrow the gap so that the region does not cross into further dangerous territory.
The writer is a business strategist.
Published in Dawn, April 3rd, 2026
